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Loan loss provisions and bank lending behavior: 
Do information sharing and borrowers’ legal rights matter? 
 
Abstract 
We examine the roles of information sharing and borrower’s legal rights in affecting the 
procyclical effect of bank loan loss provisions. Based on a sample of Asian banks, our empirical 
results highlight that higher non-discretionary provisions reduce loan growth and, hence, non-
discretionary provisions are procyclical. A closer investigation suggests that better information 
sharing through public credit registries managed by central banks, not private credit bureaus 
managed by the private sector, might substitute for the role of dynamic provisioning systems in 
mitigating the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions. We also document that higher 
discretionary provisions in countries with stronger legal rights for borrowers temper the 
procyclical effect of non-discretionary provisions. However, these findings hold only for small 
banks. This suggests that the implementation of dynamic provisioning systems to mitigate the 
procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions is more crucial for large banks. 
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Loan loss provisions and bank lending behavior:  
Do information sharing and borrowers’ legal rights matter? 
 
1. Introduction 
During the last three decades, financial crises in both developed and developing countries 
were mostly preceded by strong macroeconomic performance in an environment with poor bank 
risk management (e.g., the 1980 US savings and loan crisis, the 1994/1995 Mexican crisis, the 
1997/1998 Asian crisis, the 1998 Russian crisis, and the 2008 credit crisis that led to a prolonged 
global economic downturn). Such developments suggest an increasing need for sound credit risk 
management in banking to limit the riskiness of banks and prevent a procyclical effect during 
economic downturns. Indeed, overcoming the procyclicality of bank credit risk management—
particularly that related to bank capital regulation—has become one of the key issues in the new 
Basel Accords. The procyclical effect of credit risk management mainly occurs because banks 
tend to underestimate credit risk during cyclical upturns and overestimate it during cyclical 
downturns (Altman, 2005). Consequently, these actions reduce loan availability and deepen 
economic recessions.  
Prior studies of banks’ procyclical behavior have been conducted through two major 
research avenues. The first strand of the literature focuses on the impact of macroeconomic 
fluctuations on bank capital buffers to examine whether capital buffers are procyclical over the 
business cycle. In this regard, banks are required to fulfill minimum capital adequacy ratios in 
order to cope with credit risk. Since capital requirements are based on risk, banks tend to 
increase capital buffers and reduce loans during a cyclical downturn when impaired loans 
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materialize. The second strand of the literature explores the effect of macroeconomic fluctuations 
on loan loss provisions and how provisioning affects bank lending behavior.  
In spite of the growing literature focusing on the first strand (e.g., Ayuso et al., 2004; Borio 
et al., 2001; Estrella, 2004; Jokipii and Milne, 2008), very limited attention has been given to the 
second strand of research, particularly to the link between loan loss provisions and bank lending. 
Several studies highlight the presence of the procyclicality of loan loss provisions over the 
business cycle (e.g., Laeven and Majnoni, 2003; Bikker and Metzemakers, 2005; Craig et al., 
2006); however, only Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) assess how 
provisioning affects bank lending. Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) focus on European banks, while 
Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) extend their previous study by incorporating a sample of banks 
from emerging markets. By partitioning loan loss provisions into those that are discretionary and 
non-discretionary, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) document that non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions exacerbate a procyclical effect because higher non-discretionary provisions reduce 
bank loan growth. In contrast, discretionary loan loss provisions, particularly those related to 
income-smoothing behavior, have no significant impact on bank loan growth. In this sense, the 
adoption of a dynamic provisioning system is desirable because it allows banks to generate 
higher statistical provisions to complement discretionary provisions, which cannot directly offset 
the procyclical effect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions. Moreover, Bouvatier and Lepetit 
(2012) further document that the procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss provisions in 
banking is more pronounced in emerging markets. 
In parallel, another strand of the literature advocates for greater information sharing 
activities to strengthen financial intermediation. Greater lending activities and lower credit risk 
can be observed in countries in which public and private credit bureaus are higher quality 
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(Jappelli and Pagano, 2002). Love and Mylenko (2003) highlight the role of private credit 
bureaus and public credit registries in reducing firms’ financing constraints. Specifically, private 
credit bureaus have a greater effect on alleviating firms’ financing constraints than public credit 
registries. Brown et al. (2009) also document that greater information sharing increases bank 
lending through a reduction in intermediation cost. Houston et al. (2010) further find that 
stronger legal rights for creditors are associated with higher economic growth. Against this 
backdrop, our contribution is twofold.  
First, given that better information sharing and stronger legal rights might strengthen 
financial intermediation, we explore whether information sharing and strengthened legal rights 
for borrowers can mitigate the procyclicality of bank loan loss provisions. Hence, we highlight 
whether better credit information sharing and increased borrowers’ legal rights can substitute for 
the adoption of a dynamic provisioning system. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first 
study to examine this issue. Second, we specifically assess whether the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions—as well as the role of information sharing and legal rights in affecting such 
procyclicality—differs between large and small banks. Bank size is an important dimension in 
bank credit risk management because large banks are sometimes prone to be ―too big to fail‖ and 
have moral hazard problems (Mishkin, 2006; Kane, 2000). During economic boom periods, large 
banks can arguably generate lower loan loss provisions to anticipate unexpected credit risk 
because they believe that the government can rescue them in case of failure. As such, the role of 
bank size in the procyclicality of loan loss provisions warrants further examination. 
To examine these issues, we focus on emerging markets in Asia for at least three reasons. 
First, bank credit is the predominant source of financing for private sector businesses in Asian 
countries, and therefore, unsound credit risk management in banking can exacerbate financial 
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disintermediation during a cyclical downturn (Adams, 2008; Angkomkliew et al., 2009). Second, 
conflicts of interest between bank regulators and investors are apparent in Asian banks when 
banks rely on loan loss reserves to cope with credit risks. Agusman et al. (2009) document that 
higher loan loss reserves reduce bank stock returns. In other words, bank regulations related to 
loan loss reserves and provisioning are subject to conflicts of interest between investors and bank 
regulators, at least in the Asian context. Hence, assessing the issue of loan loss provisions in 
Asian banks is relevant to examining how bank regulations and investors’ interests might be 
harmonized, particularly through the adoption of a dynamic provisioning system that increases 
loan loss provisions during economic boom periods. Third, loan loss provisioning systems vary 
across Asian countries. Although the procyclicality of loan loss provisions became a major issue 
after the 1997 crisis, the implementation of dynamic provisioning systems is still limited in 
Asian countries.
1
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature on the 
use of loan loss provisions for bank credit risk management and its implications. Section 3 
describes our data and research method. Section 4 discusses our empirical results and presents 
our robustness checks; and Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Related review of literature and research focus 
Banks use loan loss provisions as a prudential device to manage credit risk. However, loan 
loss provisions can be procyclical with the business cycle because loans are more likely to 
default during a cyclical downturn. This, in turn, increases banks’ risk aversion, boosting loan 
                                                 
1
  See Angklomkliew et al. (2009) for further discussion of the existing loan loss provisioning systems in various 
Asian countries responding to the 1997/1998 financial crisis.  
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loss provisions (Altman, 2005). From an accounting perspective, there are two types of 
provisions for bank credit risk: specific and general (Cortavaria et al., 2000). While specific 
provisions address identified, impaired loans through an increase in loan loss reserves, general 
provisions are associated with a broad assessment of possible future losses in the entire bank 
portfolio. As banks need to estimate general provisions, such provisions can be influenced by 
subjective judgments related to managers’ discretionary behavior.  
The literature documents that general provisions can be further partitioned into non-
discretionary and discretionary components. Non-discretionary provisions cover expected credit 
risks and are considered backward-looking (Whalen, 1994; Beaver and Engel, 1996). 
Discretionary provisions are used for managerial objectives and are considered forward-looking. 
Specifically, the discretionary component is linked to three discretionary actions: capital 
management, income smoothing, and signaling (Ahmed et al., 1999; Lobo and Yang, 2001; 
Kanagaretnam et al., 2003, 2004 & 2005; Anandarajan et al., 2007; Hasan and Wall, 2004). 
The Basel Accord definition of capital emphasizes that part of general provisions counts as 
capital. When loan losses are excessive during a cyclical downturn, increases in specific 
provisions can be inadequate to cover expected loan losses. Such loan losses can erode bank 
capital and can, in turn, adversely affect banks’ incentives to grant new loans, exacerbating a 
cyclical downturn. This situation is often referred to as a ―capital crunch‖ and has been 
documented in the literature related to bank capital requirements (e.g., Bernanke and Lown, 
1991; Peek and Rosengren, 1995).  
Prior studies have documented that the bank provisioning system is procyclical in general. 
Laeven and Majnoni (2003) point out that the procyclicality of loan loss provisions can be shown 
by the negative impact on loan loss provisions of higher loan growth, economic growth, or 
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earnings. In a cross-country setting, Cavallo and Majnoni (2002) also find a negative link 
between economic growth and loan loss provisions. Bikker and Metzemakers (2005) document 
similar evidence for Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
countries. In a single country setting, Arpa et al. (2001) document the procyclicality of bank loan 
loss provisions over the business cycle in Austria, while Fernandez de Lis et al. (2001) and Pain 
(2003) document similar results for Spanish and UK banks, respectively. Packer and Zhu (2012), 
Angklomkliew et al. (2009) and Craig et al. (2006) focus on Asian banks and, again, report 
identical results. Nevertheless, to the best of our knowledge, no prior research examines how 
loan loss provisions affect bank-lending behavior in the Asian context. 
Another strand of the literature advocates for the inclusion of a sound provisioning system in 
any regulations on bank capital requirements (Cavallo and Majnoni, 2002; Banque de France, 
2001). This is because a sound provisioning system can avoid credit risk miscalculation due to 
disaster myopia in a cyclical downturn (Guttentag and Herring, 1984), herd behavior (Rajan, 
1994), or institutional memory hypothesis (Berger and Udell, 2003). Fernandez de Lis et al. 
(2001) propose a dynamic or statistical provisioning system to solve procyclicality issues for 
Spanish banks. Statistical provisions are not intended to substitute for specific provisions, but 
instead to complement the loan loss provisioning system. Specific and general provisions are 
estimated in line with traditional procedures, while statistical provisions are calculated from the 
difference between expected loan losses and specific provisions (Bouvatier and Lepetit, 2008).  
Because statistical provisions are estimated to anticipate risks due to business cycle 
fluctuations, they tend to increase during a cyclical upturn in anticipation of a future cyclical 
downturn. As a consequence, the funds obtained from ―reserves‖ generated by the statistical 
provisions in the earlier period of an economic boom can smooth bank profits and losses. 
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Consequently, incorporating statistical provisions into a bank provisioning system can mitigate 
banks’ incentives to grant new loans when expected credit risks are underestimated, particularly 
during a cyclical upturn. As long as banks can improve credit risk evaluation and profit 
management in their provisioning systems, Borio et al. (2001), Mann and Michael (2002), and 
Jiménez and Saurina (2005) support Fernandez de Lis et al.’s (2001) contention that the 
procyclicality of bank loan provisions can be resolved. 
In order to assess the importance of implementing a dynamic provisioning system for 
European countries such as Spain, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008) examine the impact of non-
discretionary and discretionary provisions on bank loan growth in several stages. In the first 
stage, they examine the determinants of bank loan loss provisions (LLP). In doing so, they create 
a LLP model in which loan loss provisions are regressed on backward-looking indicators related 
to problem loans (e.g., non-performing loans, loan-to-asset ratio, and annual GDP growth) and 
forward-looking indicators depicting the capital management, income smoothing, and signaling 
activities of banks. In the second stage, bank loan loss provisions are subsequently grouped into 
discretionary and non-discretionary components. The discretionary component is computed as 
the fitted values of the LLP model in which forward-looking indicators become explanatory 
variables. In parallel, the non-discretionary component is computed as the fitted values of the 
LLP model in which backward-looking indicators become explanatory variables. In the third 
stage, they create a regression model to examine the impact of estimated discretionary and non-
discretionary provisions on bank loan growth. They show that non-discretionary provisions 
negatively affect bank loan growth, while discretionary provisions have no statistically 
significant impact on bank loan growth. Hence, only non-discretionary provisions exacerbate the 
procyclical effect of loan loss provisions over the business cycle.  
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Building on their previous study, Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012) modify their procedure to 
estimate non-discretionary provisions by incorporating an indicator of income smoothing. They 
argue that loan loss provisions might be used to smooth income as part of bank discretionary 
behavior, and this behavior might be important for offsetting the negative impact of non-
discretionary provisions on bank loan growth. Their empirical results reveal that greater income 
smoothing tempers the negative impact of non-discretionary provisions on bank loan growth, but 
the negative impact remains apparent. In this regard, the use of a statistical or dynamic 
provisioning system is desirable because greater income smoothing is not sufficient to mitigate 
the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions.  
Despite the importance of a dynamic provisioning system, a bank’s characteristics (such as 
bank size) might determine its capacity to implement one. Similarly, each country has a different 
macroeconomic and institutional environment that can substantially vary its capacity to adopt a 
dynamic provisioning system. For such reasons, we extend prior research on the link between 
loan loss provisions and bank lending behavior by considering bank size to account for bank-
specific characteristics and information sharing and legal rights to account for country-specific 
factors. Information sharing and legal rights are relevant because financial intermediation is 
conditioned by the extent to which information systems and legal rights are of better quality 
(e.g., Jappelli and Pagano, 2002; Love and Mylenko, 2003; Brown et al., 2009; Houston et al., 
2010).  
With regards to the influence of legal rights on the link between loan loss provisions and 
bank loan growth, we consider the influence of the legal rights of borrowers instead of creditor 
legal rights as in Houston et al. (2010) because we examine the impact of loan loss provisions on 
bank loan growth from the demand side. Arguably, stronger legal rights for borrowers can 
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increase borrowers’ confidence in the banking sector. This in turn can reduce the procyclical 
effect of loan loss provisions on bank loan growth, particularly during economic downturns.  
Although we divide loan loss provisions into discretionary and non-discretionary 
components, our method differs from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008, 2012). Specifically, we do 
not distinguish between types of discretionary purposes, i.e., income smoothing, capital 
management, or signaling. In this sense, we allow for different types of discretionary behavior to 
simultaneously offset the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions, rather than focusing 
merely on the use of income smoothing as emphasized in Bouvatier and Lepetit (2012). We 
therefore follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) in grouping loan loss provisions into discretionary 
and non-discretionary provisions, which is explained in the next section.  
 
3. Data, methodology and econometric specifications 
3.1. Data sources  
From BankScope Fitch IBCA, we construct an unbalanced panel of annual bank-level data 
from 528 commercial banks in 11 countries in the Asia-Pacific region covering the 2002–2012 
period. These countries are China (153), Hong Kong (39), India (60), Indonesia (72), Malaysia 
(31), South Korea (17), Taiwan (38), Thailand (18), Pakistan (23), Philippines (31), and Vietnam 
(46).
2
 Moreover, we incorporate country-specific data such as real gross domestic product 
(RGDP) and short-term interest rate (SHRATE) retrieved from Thomson Reuters Datastream 
International.  
As this study also assesses the influence of credit information sharing and the legal rights of 
borrowers on the link between loan loss provisions and bank lending, we also retrieve data 
                                                 
2
  The numbers in parentheses represent the number of banks for each country in our sample. 
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country-level data on the credit reporting system and legal rights strength of each country. These 
data are collected from the Doing Business database provided by the World Bank. Doing 
Business 2004–2014 provides data on each country’s credit reporting system for January 2003 to 
January 2013. Therefore, such information reflects the situation at the end of each year from 
2002 to 2012.  
To account for the quality of credit information sharing, we consider the degree of credit 
information covered by private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR) and public credit registries 
(PUBREG) following Tsai et al. (2011). PRIVBUR and PUBREG describe the proportion of 
individuals and firms listed by a private credit bureau and a public credit registry, respectively. 
Information covered by these credit registries includes repayment history, unpaid debts, and 
outstanding credit. Higher PRIVBUR and PUBREG are associated with better credit information 
sharing. Information coverage by private credit bureaus is usually greater than that by public 
credit registries (Love and Mylenko, 2003). Private credit registries are more likely to collect 
information from various sources including non-bank creditors and to store more detailed 
information on borrowers. On the other hand, public credit registries tend to collect information 
only from supervised institutions and their information coverage is rather limited (Love and 
Mylenko, 2003).   
We also consider the legal rights strength index (LEGAL) from Doing Business 2004–2014 
to account for borrowers’ rights protections.3 Consideration of the influence of borrowers’ legal 
rights on the relation between loan loss provisions and bank loan growth is relevant for the 
following reasons. It is widely perceived that stronger depositor protection through deposit 
                                                 
3
  The value of LEGAL ranges from 0 to 12, where a higher value indicates stronger legal rights protections for 
borrowers. 
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insurance can reduce incentives for depositors to discipline bank risk taking (Barth et al., 2006). 
Arguably, increased borrower protection can also exacerbate entrepreneurial moral hazard, 
particularly in the presence of information asymmetry on the credit market. As loan loss 
provisioning systems form part of prudential regulations aiming to cope with bank credit risk, 
increased borrowers’ moral hazard due to stronger borrowers’ legal rights can cause risk-shifting 
from borrowers to banks à la Stiglitz and Weiss (1981). As such, stronger legal rights for 
borrowers might outweigh the role of loan loss provisions in mitigating credit risk and 
procyclical effects. On the other hand, Houston et al. (2010) emphasize that stronger protection 
of creditor rights is detrimental to financial stability, because it can increase incentives for 
creditors to undertake excessive risk taking. In this paper, we emphasize the strength of 
borrowers’ legal rights and how they impact the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions on 
growth in bank lending. To the best of our knowledge, no prior study has examined how the 
legal rights of borrowers affect financial intermediation or stability.   
 
3.2. Method 
As stated earlier, the objectives of our study are threefold. First, we examine the link 
between loan loss provisions and bank loan growth in order to highlight whether loan loss 
provisions are procyclical over the business cycle. Second, we examine whether information 
sharing and legal rights offset the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions and could substitute 
for a dynamic provisioning system. Third, in examining these issues, we consider the effect of 
bank size (i.e., large and small banks) to address the ―too-big-to-fail‖ issues related to bank risk 
taking through lending activities.  
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We initially identify the determinants of loan loss provisions for all banks. We then estimate 
discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions. Second, we examine the effect of both 
discretionary and non-discretionary loan loss provisions on bank loan growth. Third, we 
undertake a closer investigation of the influence of information sharing and legal rights on the 
link between loan loss provisions and loan growth in banking. Finally, in order to better 
understand the effect of bank size on these relationships, we repeat our tests with subsamples of 
large banks and small banks. These steps are explained further in the next section.  
 
3.3. The determinants of bank loan loss provisions 
In order to disentangle the discretionary and non-discretionary components of loan loss 
provisions, we initially estimate a LLP model with the ratio of loan loss provisions to total loans 
(LLPL) as a dependent variable following Kanagaretnam et al. (2009). We also use the ratio of 
total loan loss provisions to total assets (LLPTA) as a dependent variable in our tests. 
Specifically, we estimate the following equations: 
 
tititititi
tititititi
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   (1b) 
 
Equations (1a) and (1b) are the models for our two measures of loan loss provisions (LLPL 
and LLPTA). TIER1 is defined as Tier 1 risk adjusted capital, while CAR is total risk adjusted 
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capital. CHLOAN denotes change in total outstanding loans and LLRTA is loan loss allowance. 
EBTPS reflects earnings before tax, loan loss provisions, and special items. NPL and CHNPL 
represent total non-performing loans and change in total non-performing loans, respectively. 
Finally, LCO represents net loan charge-offs (write-offs). Because we consider both listed and 
non-listed banks in our sample, all of these variables are scaled by total bank assets rather than 
the market value of equity as in Kanagaretnam et al. (2009).  
We compute the estimated values of discretionary and non-discretionary provisions in 
period t based on either equation (1a) or (1b). We follow Kanagaretnam et al. (2009), where non-
discretionary provisions in period t (NDISC) are calculated by the fitted values of the LLP 
equation, while discretionary provisions in period t (DISC) are represented by the residuals of the 
LLP equation. We specify NDISCL and NDISCTA to reflect the non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions estimated from the LLPL and LLPTA models in equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. 
Likewise, DISCL and DISCTA are discretionary provisions calculated from the LLPL and LLPTA 
models, respectively. 
 
3.3. Bank loan loss provisions and loan growth 
 Once the estimated discretionary and non-discretionary provisions have been estimated, we 
assess the impact of non-discretionary and discretionary provisions on bank loan growth. 
Following Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), bank loan growth (DLOAN) is defined as the actual 
change in the ratio of total loans to total assets. More precisely, bank loan growth (DLOAN) is 
measured as: DLOANi,t = (Li,t – Li,t–1)/0.5(Tai,t + Tai,t–1), where L is total loans. To test for 
robustness, we also use the simple annual growth of total loans (LOANG) as a dependent 
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variable. LOANG is calculated as the difference between total loans in period t and total loans in 
period t – 1, divided by total outstanding loans in period t – 1.  
Bank loan growth is regressed against our variables of interest and several control variables 
that can affect bank loan growth using these equations following Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008): 
 
titititi
tititititi
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In equations (2a) and (2b), both DISC and NDISC are measured using either LLPL as in 
equation (1a), or LLPTA as in equation (1b).  
To control for bank-specific factors in equations (2a) and (2b), we include several bank-
specific variables. The ratio of total equity to total assets (EQTA) is included as a control variable 
because higher capitalization is expected to enhance a bank’s capacity to grant new loans as 
described in the ―capital crunch‖ literature (e.g., Bernanke and Lown, 1991; Peek and 
Rosengren, 1995). Building on Olivero et al. (2011), we consider the impact of bank liquidity 
and the ―too-big-to-fail‖ effect on bank loan growth. However, we measure bank liquidity using 
the ratio of total deposits and short-term funding to total assets (DTA) instead of the ratio of 
liquid assets to total assets as in Olivero et al. (2011) due to data availability. We expect a 
positive relation between DTA and loan growth because banks with a greater funding base have 
greater liquidity and more capacity to boost lending activities. Because larger banks tend to 
behave imprudently due to the ―too-big-to-fail‖ effect (Beck and Laeven, 2006), larger banks 
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might boost loan growth to generate profits. To account for bank size, we use the logarithm of 
bank total assets (SIZE).  
Given that our sample of banks comes from different countries, controlling for country-
specific factors is necessary. Following Olivero et al. (2011), we include the logarithm of real 
gross domestic product (LRGDP) and short-term interest rate (SHRATE) to account for each 
country’s degree of economic development and the impact of its monetary policy, respectively. 
The role of monetary policy in bank lending and higher short-term interest rates’ potential for 
tempering bank loan growth has been widely discussed.  
 
3.4. Information sharing, legal rights of borrowers, and the procyclicality of loan loss provisions 
In the next stage, we augment the analysis by assessing whether the procyclicality of loan 
loss provisions is conditional on credit information sharing and the strength of borrowers’ legal 
rights. Our focus is examining the joint impact of discretionary provisions and country-specific 
factors. From these results, we can ascertain whether any procyclical effect of non-discretionary 
provisions can be offset by the countercyclical effect of discretionary provisions, which is also 
conditional on the extent to which credit information sharing and borrowers’ legal rights are of 
better quality. If the countercyclical effect of discretionary provisions—which is dependent on 
the quality of credit information sharing and borrowers’ legal rights—can offset the procyclical 
effect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions, then statistical provisions generated from a 
dynamic provisioning system might be unnecessary.  
In examining the effect of information sharing on bank loan growth, we distinguish between 
the influence of private credit bureaus and public credit registries instead of investigating the 
influence of information sharing in general following Brown et al. (2009). Our approach to 
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defining information sharing therefore follows Tsai et al. (2011). This enables us to determine 
the type of information-sharing mechanism that matters for economic growth and financial 
stability to overcome the procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss provisions.  
For this purpose, we modify equations (2a) and (2b) to incorporate the interaction term 
between discretionary loan loss provisions and country-specific factors representing information 
sharing and borrowers’ legal rights, as shown in equations (3), (4), and (5).4  
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4
  We interact each variable representing country-specific credit market environments (i.e., private credit bureaus, 
public credit registries, and borrowers’ legal rights) with discretionary provisions instead of non-discretionary 
provisions, because only discretionary provisions can be adjusted by bank managers for capital management, 
signaling, or income smoothing purposes. Arguably, credit market environments at the country level can affect 
the extent to which capital management, signaling, or income smoothing plays a role and bank managers 
increase bank loan loss provisions. On the other hand, non-discretionary provisions cannot be easily adjusted to 
credit market environments because non-discretionary provisions are merely dependent on the degree of non-
performing loans.  
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GLOAN in the above equations is the measure of loan growth measured by either DLOAN or 
LOANG. Moreover, DISC and NDISC are two different measures depending on the definition of 
loan loss provisions used, as stated in section 3.3. with regard to equations (1a) and (1b). 
 
3.5. Information sharing, legal rights of borrowers, and the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions: Large banks versus small banks   
In the final step, we examine whether large banks and small banks have different lending 
behavior in response to higher loan loss provisions. In order to classify banks as either large or 
small banks, we calculate the average of the logarithm of total assets for each bank in the whole 
period of observation (2002–2012). We then use the 75th percentile of these average values as a 
cut-off point. A bank is considered a large bank if its average logarithm of total assets exceeds its 
75
th
 percentile, and a bank is considered a small bank if its average logarithm of total assets is 
less than its 75
th
 percentile. We construct a dummy variable (DSIZE), taking a value of 1 if a 
bank is classified as a large bank and 0 otherwise. We re-estimate equations (2a), (2b), (3), (4), 
and (5) separately for large and small bank samples.   
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. Descriptive statistics and correlation structure 
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of all variables used in this study. Descriptive 
statistics for all variables are also reported separately for large and small banks. The descriptive 
statistics indicate that small banks exhibit higher loan loss provisions on average (LLPTA and 
LLPL) than large banks. Small banks also exhibit higher average loan growth than large banks 
(DLOAN and LOANG). These initial observations highlight differences between small and large 
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banks in terms of their lending behavior and procyclicality. Overall, all of the average values of 
bank-specific variables for small banks are higher than those for large banks.
5
  
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
  
Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation coefficients for all bank-specific and country-specific 
variables used in this study. The correlations suggest that multicollinearity is not likely to be an 
issue because none of the independent variables are highly correlated. 
 
 [Insert Table 2 here] 
  
4.2. Regression results 
4.2.1. The determinants of bank loan loss provisions 
In this stage, we estimate equations (1a) and (1b) to obtain coefficients related to factors 
affecting bank loan loss provisions. Table 3 reports our estimation results. Non-performing loans 
(NPLTA), change in non-performing loans (CHNPL) and net loan charge-offs (CHOFFTA) are 
associated with higher loan loss provisions measured by both LLPTA and LLPL. Meanwhile, the 
Tier 1 capital ratio (RTIER1) has a significant and positive association with LLPTA but no 
significant association with LLPL. Changes in total loans (CHLOAN) and loan loss reserves 
(LLRTA) have a negative association with both measures of loan loss provisions (LLPTA and 
LLPL). The negative association between CHLOAN and loan loss provisions (LLPTA and LLPL) 
                                                 
5
  We performed simple comparisons between small banks and large banks for the various indicators presented in 
Table 1. The results of untabulated t-tests reveal that small banks and large banks are indeed different.  
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indicates that loan loss provisions are procyclical because increased loan activities reflecting 
economic boom periods tend to reduce loan loss provisions. This finding is consistent with Asea 
and Blomberg (1998), and Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008), who analyze US banks and European 
banks, respectively.  
However, Kanagaretnam et al. (2009) show that the coefficient of CHLOAN in the loan loss 
provision regression is positive, suggesting that the banks in their sample behave prudently by 
building up loan loss provisions to cover default risk exposure following the expansion of 
lending activities. This also indicates that the procyclicality of the loan loss provisioning system 
is less likely to occur in their bank sample.  
We also find that the earning variable (EBTPS) has no clear impact on loan loss provisions 
as reflected in its negative association with LLPTA and positive association with LLPL. This 
result suggests that the banks in our sample tend to use loan loss provisions for non-discretionary 
purposes, particularly to deal with higher non-performing loans and charge-offs. In other words, 
banks increase loan loss provisions because their expected credit risk increases.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
 
4.2.2. Bank loan loss provisions and loan growth 
In this section, we differentiate the effects of non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss 
provisions on bank lending. Specifically, we aim to assess what types of provisions amplify 
business cycle fluctuations through bank lending.   
 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
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The results reported in Table 4 indicate that only non-discretionary loan loss provisions 
amplify procyclical effects because higher non-discretionary loan loss provisions tend to reduce 
bank loan growth. This result is robust for our different measures of non-discretionary loan loss 
provisions and bank loan growth. The bank capital ratio (EQTA) is negatively linked to bank 
loan growth measured by LOANG, while the deposits-to-assets ratio (DTA) exhibits no 
significant association with bank loan growth. Bank size (SIZE) has a significant and positive 
association with bank loan growth. This follows from the notion that bank risk taking—which 
might come from greater lending activities—increases due the ―too-big-to-fail‖ effect as the asset 
size of banks increases (Beck and Laeven, 2006; Mishkin, 2006; Kane, 2000).   
With regard to country-specific control variables, only short-term interest rate (SHRATE) is 
significant, and it has a negative association with bank loan growth. This result suggests that the 
bank lending channel occurs in Asian banks, following Olivero et al. (2011).  
 
4.2.3. Information sharing, legal rights of borrowers, and the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions 
To test whether information sharing and borrowers’ legal rights offset the procyclical effect 
of non-discretionary loan loss provisions, we estimate equations (3) to (5). Table 5 presents our 
results when the effect of private credit bureaus is taken into consideration, while Tables 6 and 7 
report our results regarding the influence of public credit registries and borrowers’ legal rights, 
respectively.  
Consistent with our previous results, the results reported in Table 5 initially indicate that 
non-discretionary loan loss provisions exhibit a procyclical effect because of the negative link 
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between non-discretionary provisions (NDISCTA and NDISCL) and bank loan growth (DLOAN 
and LOANG). This procyclical effect is not offset by discretionary provisions (measured by 
DISCTA or DISCL) because discretionary provisions do not have a significant association with 
bank loan growth. In this respect, there is no countercyclical effect of discretionary provisions to 
offset the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions.  
Table 5 documents the negative and significant coefficients of the interactions between 
discretionary loan loss provisions (DISCTA or DISCL) and private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR), 
but the stand-alone explanatory variables have no significant impact on bank loan growth. This 
suggests that, if the quality of private credit bureaus exceeds a certain level, then the link 
between discretionary provisions and bank loan growth becomes negative.
6
 Given the negative 
coefficients of non-discretionary provisions (NDISCTA or NDISCL), and the negative 
coefficients of the interaction terms between discretionary provisions and private credit bureaus, 
the presence of private credit bureaus is not sufficient to overcome the procyclicality of loan loss 
                                                 
6
  By considering equation (3) and the relevant results of Table 5 we generate the following equation: DLOAN = 
0.1128*DISCTA – 1.3869*DISCTA*PRIVBUR. In the presence of private credit bureaus, the marginal effect on 
bank loan growth of an increase in discretionary provisions can be determined by taking a partial derivative with 
respect to DISCTA and we obtain:  
PRIVBUR
DISCTA
DLOAN
*3869.11128.0 


 
Now if we substitute 0.1736 (Table 1 value for PRIVBUR for all banks) into the preceding we obtain: 0.1128 – 
1.3869*0.1736 = –0.12797 < 0. This suggests that loan growth decreases with improved information and hence 
decreases the pro-cyclical effect. Alternatively it suggests that the cut-off point of PRIVBUR is 0.1128/1.3869 = 
0.0813. This means that the negative link between discretionary provisions (DISCTA) and bank loan growth 
(DLOAN) occurs if the level of private credit bureaus coverage exceeds 8.13%. 
  
 24 
provisions. This is because discretionary provisions also become procyclical once a certain level 
of quality of private credit bureaus has been reached. In other words, for countries with better 
private credit bureaus, the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions shown by the negative 
sign of NDISCTA or NDISCL is aggravated by the procyclicality of discretionary provisions.  
 
[Insert Table 5 here]  
 
Next, we examine the influence of information sharing, measured by the quality of public 
credit registries (PUBREG) on the link between discretionary provisions and loan growth. Our 
aim is to test whether the quality of information sharing provided by public credit registries 
offsets the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions.  
In Table 6, the interaction terms between discretionary loan loss provisions (DISCTA and 
DISCL) and public credit registries (PUBREG) exhibit a positive and significant impact on bank 
loan growth. Moreover, the sum of the coefficients of DISCTA (or DISCL) and the interaction 
terms are higher than the coefficients of non-discretionary provisions (NDISCTA and NDISCL).
7
 
Hence, higher discretionary provisions in countries with better public credit registries offset the 
                                                 
7
  In the presence of public credit registries, the marginal effect on bank loan growth of an increase in discretionary 
provisions (DISCTA) can be calculated as f1 + f9 PUBREG, which is positive for values of PUBREG higher than 
0.3619/2.1265 = 0.1702. The net effect of DISCTA is equal to the sum of DISCTA and DISCTA*PUBREG 
(1.7646), which is higher than the negative coefficient of NDISCTA (-0.4567). Overall, this suggests that the net 
positive impact of DISCTA on bank loan growth after a certain level of public credit registry quality is reached 
outweighs the negative impact of NDISCTA on bank loan growth. Hence, the countercyclical effect of 
discretionary provisions offsets the procyclical effect of non-discretionary provisions when the coverage of 
public credit registries exceeds 17.02%.  
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procyclical impact of non-discretionary provisions on bank loan growth. For this reason, a 
dynamic provisioning system to cope with the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions 
could be replaced by high quality public credit registries.  
 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
In Table 7, we examine the effect of interaction terms between discretionary provisions 
(DISCTA or DISCL) and borrowers’ legal rights (LEGAL) on bank loan growth. Higher 
discretionary provisions in countries with stronger legal rights for borrowers (DISCTA*LEGAL 
or DISCL*LEGAL) exhibit a positive impact on bank loan growth. However, the positive effect 
related to the sum of the coefficients of discretionary provisions and such interaction terms with 
borrowers’ legal rights is smaller than the negative coefficients of non-discretionary provisions. 
Accordingly, stronger legal rights for borrowers combined with higher discretionary provisions 
temper the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions on bank loan growth.  
  
[Insert Table 7 here] 
 
4.2.4. Information sharing, legal rights of borrowers, and the procyclicality of loan loss 
provisions: Large banks versus small banks 
In this section, we differentiate the effect of information sharing and legal rights for 
borrowers on the procyclical impact of loan loss provisions with respect to bank size. Table 8 
shows that, for large banks, both non-discretionary and discretionary loan loss provisions have a 
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procyclical impact on bank lending because both discretionary and non-discretionary provisions 
are negatively associated with bank loan growth. 
 
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
In Table 9, we document that, for large banks, the coefficients of the interaction terms 
between discretionary provisions and private credit bureaus (DISCL*PRIVBUR) are higher than 
the coefficients of discretionary loan loss provisions (DISCL). This indicates that, after the 
quality of private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR) reaches a certain level, discretionary provisions can 
become countercyclical due to the positive link between discretionary provisions and bank loan 
growth.
8
 Nevertheless, the countercyclical effect of discretionary provisions for large banks in 
countries with better quality PRIVBUR cannot offset the procyclical effect of non-discretionary 
provisions measured by NDISCL. This is because the negative coefficients of NDISCL are higher 
than the sum of the coefficients of DISCL and DISCL*PRIVBUR. 
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
 
In Table 10, the coefficients for the interaction terms between discretionary loan loss 
provisions and public credit registries (DISCTA*PUBREG or DISCL*PUBREG) are not 
statistically significant for our sample of large banks, whereas both discretionary and non-
                                                 
8
  For instance, if DLOAN is used as a measure of bank loan growth as in Table 9 (column 3), the cut-off point of 
PRIVBUR is equal to 2.7393/3.8699 = 70.8%. If LOANG is used as a measure of bank loan growth as in Table 9 
(column 4), the cut-off point of PRIVBUR is equal to 7.6799/12.3646 = 62.1%.  
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discretionary provisions are negatively associated with bank loan growth. These results highlight 
that both types of provisions are procyclical, while such procyclical effects cannot be offset by 
the role of public credit registries.  
 
[Insert Table 10 here] 
 
In Table 11, we report that the degree of borrowers’ legal rights has no significant effect on 
the procyclicality of loan loss provisions. We also find that both discretionary and non-
discretionary provisions are procyclical. Overall, we find that the procyclicality of non-
discretionary provisions for large banks cannot be offset by discretionary provisions or by the 
quality of private credit bureaus, private credit registries, or borrowers’ legal rights. For large 
banks, a dynamic provisioning system can therefore be necessary to increase statistical 
provisions in order to cope with the procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions that amplify 
business cycle fluctuations.  
 
[Insert Table 11 here] 
 
Tables 12 to 15 report the results from re-estimating equations (2) to (5) for our sample of 
small banks. As reported in Table 12, only non-discretionary provisions (NDISCTA and 
NDISCL) have a significant and negative association with bank loan growth (DLOAN and 
LOANG). In Table 13, we further document that the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions on 
small banks cannot be offset by the role of private credit bureaus (PRIVBUR). In this regard, the 
sum of coefficients of the interaction terms (DISCTA*PRIVBUR or DISCL*PRIVBUR) and 
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discretionary provisions (DISCTA and DISCL) are negative, increasing the magnitude of the 
negative coefficients of non-discretionary provisions.  
 
[Insert Table 12, 13, 14, and 15 here] 
 
Tables 14 and 15 present our results when we take into account the effect of public credit 
registries and borrowers’ legal rights, respectively. We find strong evidence that better public 
credit registries and stronger legal rights for borrowers, combined with higher discretionary 
provisions, offset the procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss provisions. The results 
reported in Table 14 show that discretionary provisions are countercylical and their 
countercyclical effect is higher than the procyclical effect of non-discretionary provisions, 
especially after the quality of public credit registries (PUBREG) reaches a certain level.
9
 
Similarly, the results in Table 15 suggest that discretionary provisions can become 
countercylical, and their countercyclical effect is greater than the procyclical effect of non-
discretionary provisions, especially after the degree of borrowers’ legal rights (LEGAL) reaches a 
certain level.  
On the whole, we find that discretionary loan loss provision use is sufficient to offset the 
procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss provisions for small banks in countries with better 
quality public credit bureaus and stronger legal rights for borrowers. In other words, a dynamic 
                                                 
9
  For instance, column 1 (Table 14) shows that the cut-off point of PUBREG is equal to 0.2113/1.5881 = 13.3%. 
The sum of the coefficient of discretionary provisions (DISCTA) and the interaction term (DISCTA*PUBREG) is 
equal to 1.5881, which is also higher than the negative coefficient of non-discretionary provisions (0.4558). 
Accordingly, the net effect of loan loss provisions is equal to 1.5881 – 0.4558 = 1.1323. In this regard, loan loss 
provisions for small banks are countercyclical, especially after PUBREG reaches 13.3%.  
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provisioning system that increases statistical provisions might not be crucial for small banks if 
public credit registries and borrower’s legal rights are of sufficient quality. Strengthening public 
credit registries and borrowers’ legal rights might therefore be an option for coping with the 
procyclicality of non-discretionary provisions instead of forcing small banks to implement a 
dynamic provisioning system.  
 
5. Conclusion 
We examine the effect of loan loss provisions on the lending behavior of banks by 
considering the influence of credit information sharing and legal rights for borrowers. In general, 
we show that the non-discretionary loan loss provisions of Asian banks are procyclical because 
higher non-discretionary loan loss provisions are significantly associated with a decline in bank 
loan growth. This procyclical effect for non-discretionary loan loss provisions occurs in both 
large and small banks. For large banks, we also find that discretionary loan loss provisions 
exhibit a procyclical effect, as discretionary loan loss provisions in large banks are negatively 
associated with loan growth.   
Furthermore, we generally document that, for all banks, credit information sharing and legal 
rights for borrowers can reduce the procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss provisions. 
Specifically, higher discretionary loan loss provisions of banks in countries with better quality 
public credit registries (but not private credit bureaus) and stronger legal rights for borrowers can 
offset, or at least temper, the negative impact of non-discretionary loan loss provisions on bank 
loan growth. However, these results only hold for our sample of small banks. In other words, we 
find evidence that small banks in countries with better public credit registries and stronger legal 
rights for borrowers can simply use discretionary loan loss provisions to offset the procyclicality 
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of non-discretionary loan loss provisions. For small banks, higher discretionary loan loss 
provisions, combined with better quality public credit registries or borrowers’ legal rights, are 
significantly associated with an increase in loan growth. This positive effect for discretionary 
loan loss provisions is greater than the negative effect of non-discretionary loan loss provisions 
on loan growth. Small banks in countries with better public credit registries and stronger legal 
rights for borrowers do not require a dynamic provisioning system to overcome their procyclical 
behavior—although we do not discourage small banks from implementing a dynamic 
provisioning system.  
In contrast, we do not find that high quality private credit bureaus, public credit registries, or 
legal rights for borrowers offset the procyclicality of non-discretionary loan loss provisions in 
large banks. In this regard, the implementation of a dynamic provisioning system is more 
important for large banks than for small banks. Hence, bank regulators need to pay closer 
attention to large banks’ implementation of dynamic provisioning systems. This is because 
higher non-discretionary loan loss provisions in large banks reduce loan growth, and this 
reduction cannot be simply offset by discretionary loan loss provisions even if the quality of 
credit information sharing and legal rights of borrowers are strengthened.  
Overall, our study identifies those conditions in which a dynamic provisioning system can 
mitigate the procyclical behavior of Asian banks. Our study is important because all Asian banks 
do not have the same capacity to implement a dynamic provisioning system. Similarly, regarding 
the procyclical effect of loan loss provisions, non-discretionary provisions can vary from country 
to country depending on the strength of public credit registries and the legal rights of borrowers. 
In this respect, each country has different macroeconomic environments that determine the 
effectiveness of dynamic provisioning systems.   
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 Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variables 
All banks Large banks Small banks 
 Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev.  Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
Loan loss provisions 
   
  
  
  
  
LLPL 0.0081 0.0057 0.0316 0.0080 0.0055 0.0096 0.0081 0.0058 0.0365 
LLPTA 0.0049 0.0030 0.0232 0.0045 0.0031 0.0058 0.0050 0.0029 0.0268 
LLRTA 0.0196 0.0107 0.0521 0.0148 0.0096 0.0175 0.0214 0.0114 0.0597 
Capital adequacy ratios 
   
  
  
  
  
RTIER1 0.1636 0.1100 0.2594 0.1031 0.0973 0.0339 0.1916 0.1190 0.3089 
CAR 0.1931 0.1381 0.2483 0.1345 0.1308 0.0400 0.2172 0.1441 0.2905 
EQTA 0.1144 0.0789 0.1210 0.0680 0.0645 0.0274 0.1308 0.0898 0.1361 
Loan growth 
   
  
  
  
  
DLOAN 0.1013 0.0934 0.1214 0.0881 0.0870 0.0751 0.1061 0.0963 0.1341 
LOANG 0.2224 0.2035 0.2202 0.1871 0.1826 0.1571 0.2360 0.2123 0.2389 
CHLOAN 0.0856 0.0853 0.1065 0.0790 0.0802 0.0660 0.0881 0.0881 0.1178 
Non-performing loans   
 
  
  
  
   NPLTA 0.0256 0.0128 0.0438 0.0206 0.0097 0.0315 0.0276 0.0143 0.0476 
CHNPL -0.0413 -0.0080 1.9045 -0.1404 -0.0224 1.2089 -0.0009 -0.0005 2.1227 
CHOFFTA 0.0034 0.0012 0.0095 0.0034 0.0015 0.0068 0.0034 0.0010 0.0106 
Information sharing   
 
  
  
  
   PRIVBUR 0.1736 0.0000 0.3039 0.3161 0.1020 0.3805 0.1286 0.0000 0.2660 
PUBREG 0.1244 0.0080 0.1873 0.1344 0.0000 0.2511 0.1222 0.0460 0.1620 
Legal rights of borrowers   
 
  
  
  
   
LEGAL 5.94 5.00 2.13 6.26 5.00 2.35 5.82 5.00 2.06 
Control variables   
 
  
  
  
   EBTPS 0.0180 0.0167 0.0275 0.0164 0.0157 0.0084 0.0186 0.0174 0.0317 
DTA 0.8115 0.8510 0.1410 0.8490 0.8681 0.0993 0.7981 0.8430 0.1509 
SIZE 15.1578 15.2605 1.9815 17.4306 17.1988 1.1503 14.3517 14.5815 1.5387 
LGDPR 13.1775 14.1097 2.0738 12.9685 13.3533 2.1604 13.2521 14.2056 2.0420 
SHRATE 0.0507 0.0390 0.0354 0.0361 0.0317 0.0245 0.0548 0.0447 0.0371 
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Table 2. Correlation coefficients 
 
Variables LLPL LLPTA DLOAN LOANG RTIER1 CAR CHLOAN LLRTA EBTPS NPLTA CHNPL 
LLPL 1.0000           
LLPTA 0.6447 1.0000          
DLOAN 0.0040 -0.0286 1.0000         
LOANG -0.0508 -0.0526 0.9048 1.0000        
RTIER1 -0.2496 -0.1030 -0.1284 -0.0138 1.0000       
CAR -0.2743 -0.1066 -0.1211 0.0088 0.9881 1.0000      
CHLOAN 0.0227 -0.0172 0.9484 0.8889 -0.1508 -0.1421 1.0000     
LLRTA 0.0416 0.0748 -0.1470 -0.1310 0.0885 0.0034 -0.1557 1.0000    
EBTPS 0.0732 -0.0049 -0.0161 0.0485 -0.0039 0.0300 -0.0015 0.0972 1.0000   
NPLTA 0.1560 0.1943 -0.1830 -0.1838 0.1109 -0.0264 -0.1856 0.7914 0.0318 1.0000  
CHNPL 0.2160 0.3658 0.0506 0.0285 -0.1082 -0.1456 0.0416 0.0483 -0.0889 0.1596 1.0000 
CHOFFTA 0.2802 0.1428 -0.1110 -0.0813 -0.0210 0.0376 -0.1010 0.1426 0.0783 0.1360 -0.3791 
EQTA -0.0878 -0.1289 -0.0852 -0.0093 0.6952 0.6788 -0.1346 0.0805 0.0799 0.1082 -0.1588 
DTA 0.0936 0.0650 0.1200 0.0445 -0.5589 -0.5395 0.1604 -0.1919 -0.1552 -0.1582 0.0623 
SIZE 0.0594 0.0263 -0.0622 -0.0908 -0.4222 -0.4282 -0.0195 -0.1696 -0.0220 -0.2379 0.0326 
LGDPR 0.0317 0.0392 -0.1029 -0.1584 0.0423 0.0420 -0.1142 0.1207 -0.0109 0.1587 0.0782 
SHRATE 0.0437 0.0315 0.0072 -0.0099 -0.1012 -0.0247 0.0075 0.0753 0.0750 0.0721 0.1337 
PRIVBUR -0.0217 -0.0139 -0.1961 -0.2193 0.1119 0.0893 -0.2013 -0.0579 -0.0907 -0.0954 -0.0239 
PUBREG -0.0845 -0.0159 0.0095 0.0230 0.0754 0.0735 0.0116 -0.1028 0.0110 -0.1660 0.0116 
LEGAL -0.0346 -0.0484 -0.0863 -0.0625 0.1226 0.1371 -0.1013 -0.0876 -0.0099 -0.1368 0.0058 
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Variables CHOFFTA EQTA DTA SIZE LGDPR SHRATE PRIVBUR PUBREG LEGAL 
CHOFFTA 1 
        EQTA 0.0531 1 
       DTA -0.0734 -0.8543 1 
      SIZE -0.0539 -0.5165 0.4206 1 
     LGDPR 0.0209 0.1384 -0.1808 -0.1740 1 
    SHRATE -0.0160 -0.0307 -0.0369 -0.1743 0.2476 1 
   PRIVBUR 0.0239 0.1388 -0.1336 0.0950 0.3118 -0.3852 1 
  PUBREG -0.1321 -0.0092 -0.0104 0.0817 0.0056 0.0713 0.0389 1 
 LEGAL -0.1258 0.1106 -0.1364 0.0063 0.1653 0.1149 0.4621 0.2961 1 
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Table 3. The determinants of loan loss provisions in banking 
Explanatory variables 
LLPTA LLPL 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  RTIER1(-1) 0.0343* 1.9605 -0.0027 -0.3402 
CAR(-1) -0.0115 -0.5596 -0.0371*** -3.9739 
CHLOAN -0.0212** -2.3828 -0.0114*** -2.8172 
LLRTA(-1) -1.1603*** -13.417 -0.2716*** -6.4866 
EBTPS -1.1700*** -15.0759 0.1728*** 4.3119 
NPLTA(-1) 0.3459*** 5.8196 0.2171*** 7.9951 
CHNPL 0.0104*** 17.2648 0.0047*** 16.1862 
LCO 1.4453*** 11.2494 0.8738*** 14.5973 
 
    
  Observations 1299 
 
1298   
R-squared 0.7089   0.3938 
 F-statistic 7.2331***   104.6929***   
Notes: Dependent variables are LLPTA (the ratio of loan loss provisions to total assets) or LLPL (the ratio of loan loss provisions to 
total loans). CAR is the ratio of total capital to risk-weighted assets. CHLOAN denotes change in total outstanding loans. LLRTA is 
loan loss allowance to total assets. EBTPS reflects earnings before tax, loan loss provisions, and special items divided by total assets. 
NPL and CHNPL represent the ratio of total non-performing loans to total assets and change in total non-performing loans, 
respectively. Finally, CHOFFTA represents the ratio of net loan charge-offs (write-offs) to total assets. Estimations are carried out 
using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent 
level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 4. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for all banks 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -0.0299 -0.2471 -0.0936 -0.4024     
  NDISCTA -0.3032*** -2.7095 -0.5797*** -2.6704     
  DISCL     
  
-0.4718 -1.1127 -0.6834 -1.3709 
NDISCL     
  
-2.1512*** -3.7347 -4.1589*** -6.2076 
EQTA -0.2017 -1.1051 -0.4795* -1.7903 -0.1843 -0.8372 -0.4052 -1.5336 
DTA -0.0789 -0.8518 -0.1373 -0.8993 -0.1240 -1.1799 -0.1644 -1.0946 
SIZE 0.0711*** 3.8038 0.1004*** 3.4140 0.0806*** 3.5319 0.1163*** 3.9901 
LGDPR -0.0969 -1.5707 -0.0303 -0.2559 -0.1300 -1.6424 -0.0883 -0.7577 
SHRATE -1.0425*** -5.5349 -2.2065*** -6.0711 -1.0176*** -4.6068 -2.1692*** -6.0741 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 1298 
 
1272 
 
1297 
 
1271 
 R-squared 0.5807   0.5519 
 
0.5983   0.5674 
 F-statistic 4.1425***   3.5993***   4.4496***   3.8295***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both 
cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 5. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for all banks: Do private credit bureaus matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA 0.1128 0.8156 0.1546 0.6465     
  NDISCTA -0.3977*** -2.9725 -0.7574*** -2.7448     
  DISCL     
  
-0.1110 -0.3692 0.1077 0.1695 
NDISCL     
  
-2.1508*** -6.8336 -4.0790*** -6.0902 
EQTA -0.1698 -1.1329 -0.4619** -1.9873 -0.1762 -1.5080 -0.4125 -1.5484 
DTA -0.0537 -0.4989 -0.1133 -0.4561 -0.0899 -1.2377 -0.1423 -0.9247 
SIZE 0.0762*** 3.6855 0.1084** 2.5786 0.0843*** 5.9946 0.1254*** 4.2748 
LGDPR -0.0699 -0.8925 0.0013 0.0079 -0.1009* -1.7233 -0.0645 -0.5347 
SHRATE -1.0373*** -2.6429 -2.1887*** -2.6485 -1.0420*** -5.9289 -2.2129*** -6.1983 
PRIVBUR 0.0453 1.5816 0.0609 0.8408 0.0425** 2.0341 0.0511 1.1575 
DISCTA*PRIVBUR -1.3869* -1.6604 -2.6228** -1.7394     
  DISCL*PRIVBUR     
  
-1.4558* -1.8971 -3.3121** -2.0066 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 1298 
 
1272 
 
1297 
 
1271 
 R-squared 0.5847   0.5545 
 
0.6015   0.5699 
 F-statistic 4.1767***   3.6095***   4.4731***   3.8370***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PRIVBUR is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 6. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for all banks: Do public credit registries matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -0.3619* -1.6632 -0.5826 -0.9283     
  NDISCTA -0.4567*** -3.4218 -0.8186*** -2.9803     
  DISCL     
  
-0.7819*** -2.7717 -1.1705** -2.0993 
NDISCL     
  
-2.1697*** -6.8640 -4.1665*** -4.8293 
EQTA -0.1885*** -1.6035 -0.4759*** -2.5399 -0.1813 -1.5697 -0.3919*** -2.9474 
DTA -0.0877 -1.2254 -0.1589 -0.6466 -0.1289* -1.8321 -0.1783 -0.7932 
SIZE 0.0782*** 5.3323 0.1124*** 2.6199 0.0841*** 5.8333 0.1241*** 3.3402 
LGDPR -0.0916 -1.5759 -0.0171 -0.0809 -0.1244** -2.1829 -0.0844 -0.3928 
SHRATE -1.0288*** -5.7241 -2.1857*** -2.6988 -1.0199*** -5.7944 -2.1686*** -2.8685 
PUBREG -0.0699 -1.4405 -0.1213 -0.8566 -0.0427 -0.8987 -0.0804 -0.5641 
DISCTA*PUBREG 2.1265** 1.8456 3.1589* 0.8874     
  DISCL*PUBREG     
  
3.5615** 2.0675 6.5730** 2.3258 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 1298 
 
1272 
 
1297 
 
1271 
 R-squared 0.5830   0.5533 
 
0.6004   0.5689 
 F-statistic 4.1478***   3.5909***   4.4522***   3.8213***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loss provisions calculated from the fitted values of 
equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term funds 
to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-term 
interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PUBREG is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a public credit 
registry. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 7. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for all banks: Do borrowers’ legal rights matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -0.0389 -0.0713 -2.3017*** -2.7017     
  NDISCTA -0.2902*** -2.7208 -0.5031** -2.3780     
  DISCL     
  
-3.1598*** -7.7593 -8.1523*** -5.4426 
NDISCL     
  
-2.1996*** -6.8869 -4.2818*** -5.3143 
EQTA -0.1949* -1.6528 -0.4959** -2.4985 -0.1347 -1.3035 -0.4142*** -3.0302 
DTA -0.0838 -1.1665 -0.1304 -0.5398 -0.1176 -1.2358 -0.1537 -0.7339 
SIZE 0.0747*** 5.1287 0.1018** 2.4265 0.0796*** 4.1059 0.1146*** 2.8792 
LGDPR -0.1346** -2.0373 -0.0594 -0.2447 -0.1246 -1.1455 -0.0596 -0.2340 
SHRATE -1.0686*** -5.8972 -2.2395*** -2.8789 -1.0111*** -3.0959 -2.1220*** -2.9244 
LEGAL 0.0113 1.1724 0.0129 0.6954 0.0007 0.0691 -0.0052 -0.2542 
DISCTA*LEGAL 0.0019 0.0184 0.4251*** 2.8051     
  DISCL*LEGAL     
  
0.4829*** 5.8487 1.3854*** 5.3672 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 1298 
 
1272 
 
1297 
 
1271 
 R-squared 0.5813   0.5539 
 
0.6028   0.5738 
 F-statistic 4.1187***   3.5988***   4.4976***   3.8993***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. LEGAL is the strength of borrowers’ legal rights developed by the Doing 
Business database. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 8. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for large bank sample 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -2.6547*** -3.6877 -4.7344*** -3.2464     
  NDISCTA -2.5661*** -3.7126 -4.5915*** -3.2917     
  DISCL     
  
-1.4626* -1.7393 -2.2603** -2.2973 
NDISCL     
  
-2.8158** -2.4237 -5.8621*** -4.3522 
EQTA -0.2059 -0.6861 0.5247 0.8489 -0.2901 -0.6302 0.2191 0.3538 
DTA -0.2049 -1.2825 -0.2259 -0.7057 -0.2296 -0.7712 -0.2656 -0.8406 
SIZE 0.1432*** 5.3932 0.1973*** 3.4568 0.1479*** 5.9142 0.2177*** 3.8657 
LGDPR -0.1479* -1.7953 -0.0601 -0.3540 -0.1441 -1.0707 -0.0650 -0.3879 
SHRATE -1.1256*** -3.4242 -2.3136*** -3.5221 -1.1818* -2.2693 -2.4619*** -3.7893 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 481 
 
478 
 
481 
 
478 
 R-squared 0.3037   0.3380 
 
0.3188   0.3544 
 F-statistic 2.9211***   3.2347***   3.0614***   3.4029***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both 
cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 9. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for large bank sample: Do private credit bureaus matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -2.7338*** -3.5601 -4.7818*** -3.0670     
  NDISCTA -2.5161*** -3.6469 -4.5319*** -3.2390     
  DISCL     
  
-2.7393*** -3.3736 -6.1875*** -3.7755 
NDISCL     
  
-3.3731*** -4.7521 -7.6799*** -5.2858 
EQTA -0.1107 -0.3684 0.6119 0.9879 -0.1279 -0.4248 0.6346 1.0206 
DTA -0.2068 -1.2988 -0.2341 -0.7287 -0.2031 -1.2923 -0.1707 -0.5439 
SIZE 0.1459*** 5.5253 0.2075*** 3.6037 0.1519*** 5.8711 0.2272*** 4.0834 
LGDPR -0.0591 -0.6652 0.0450 0.2480 -0.0597 -0.6807 0.0394 0.2225 
SHRATE -1.2276*** -3.7335 -2.4454*** -3.7014 -1.1299*** -3.4171 -2.1129*** -3.1892 
PRIVBUR 0.1095** 2.5142 0.1484* 1.6659 0.1164*** 2.7162 0.1730** 1.9932 
DISCTA*PRIVBUR 0.8618 0.8274 0.9369 0.4044     
  DISCL*PRIVBUR     
  
3.8699** 2.0807 12.3646*** 3.0703 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 481 
 
478 
 
481 
 
478 
 R-squared 0.3130   0.3397 
 
0.3351   0.3727 
 F-statistic 2.9707***   3.2111***   3.1794***   3.5534***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PRIVBUR is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 10. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for large bank sample: Do public credit registries matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -2.4464*** -3.5441 -4.8505*** -3.2048     
  NDISCTA -2.4715*** -5.2810 -4.4946*** -3.6715     
  DISCL     
  
-1.3760*** -2.7166 -2.2354** -2.1128 
NDISCL     
  
-2.7542*** -4.0707 -5.5879*** -4.0624 
EQTA -0.2309 -0.4939 0.3698 0.3376 -0.3210 -1.0737 0.1548 0.2515 
DTA -0.2824 -1.0146 -0.4088 -0.8586 -0.3026* -1.8840 -0.4299 -1.3413 
SIZE 0.1423*** 4.9985 0.1966** 2.4953 0.1478*** 5.6806 0.2158*** 3.8565 
LGDPR -0.0760 -0.5157 0.0569 0.1758 -0.0794 -0.9315 0.0691 0.3958 
SHRATE -1.0438** -2.0522 -2.1135** -2.0655 -1.0748*** -3.2857 -2.2530*** -3.4541 
PUBREG -0.1527** -2.0972 -0.3248*** -2.6401 -0.1483** -2.4489 -0.3157*** -2.6156 
DISCTA*PUBREG -1.7936 -0.3292 5.7263 1.1293     
  DISCL*PUBREG     
  
-2.4895 -0.6133 -1.7347 -0.2099 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 481 
 
478 
 
481 
 
478 
 R-squared 0.3122   0.3497 
 
0.3263   0.3628 
 F-statistic 2.9629***   3.3106***   3.0945***   3.4473***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PUBREG is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a public credit 
registry. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 11. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for large bank sample: Do borrowers’ legal rights matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -2.2932*** -1.8412 -5.2622*** -2.7008     
  NDISCTA -2.5085*** -3.4616 -4.5227*** -3.3881     
  DISCL     
  
-2.7271 -1.1069 -6.1891 -1.3808 
NDISCL     
  
-2.7415*** -2.6865 -5.6859*** -2.6964 
EQTA -0.2001 -0.5666 0.4818 0.7184 -0.3004 -0.9499 0.1975 0.3338 
DTA -0.2131 -0.8130 -0.2269 -0.4743 -0.2347 -0.8808 -0.2698 -0.5504 
SIZE 0.1434*** 3.5939 0.1986** 2.3122 0.1498*** 3.8243 0.2223*** 2.6181 
LGDPR -0.1604 -1.5919 -0.0786 -0.4197 -0.1596 -1.5703 -0.0942 -0.4929 
SHRATE -1.1378*** -3.7820 -2.3347*** -3.8466 -1.1575*** -3.8925 -2.3722*** -3.9187 
LEGAL 0.4855 0.2998 0.5043 0.1573 0.2645 0.1644 0.2534 0.0799 
DISCTA*LEGAL -6.0469 -0.2828 12.0482 0.4142     
  DISCL*LEGAL     
  
24.9243 0.5191 76.4717 0.8891 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 481 
 
478 
 
481 
 
478 
 R-squared 0.3005   0.3348 
 
0.3167   0.3540 
 F-statistic 2.8576***   3.1627***   3.0041***   3.3549***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. LEGAL is the strength of borrowers’ legal rights developed by the Doing 
Business database. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. 
*** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
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Table 12. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for small bank sample 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA 0.0537 0.4058 0.0105 0.0381     
  NDISCTA -0.3532*** -2.8634 -0.6955*** -2.6839     
  DISCL     
  
-0.1626 -0.5680 -0.2189 -0.3574 
NDISCL     
  
-2.3166*** -6.0646 -4.1564*** -5.0061 
EQTA -0.1999 -1.4749 -0.6045* -1.9061 -0.1592 -1.1982 -0.4569 -1.4576 
DTA -0.0330 -0.3944 -0.0651 -0.3543 -0.0932 -1.1322 -0.1104 -0.6107 
SIZE 0.0543*** 3.0962 0.0811** 2.2364 0.0635*** 3.6761 0.0949*** 2.6373 
LGDPR -0.1528* -1.7803 -0.1936 -1.0881 -0.2132** -2.5305 -0.3021* -1.7147 
SHRATE -1.1078*** -4.9251 -2.2342*** -4.8611 -1.0835*** -4.9379 -2.2036*** -4.8772 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 817 
 
794 
 
816 
 
793 
 R-squared 0.4818   0.4147 
 
0.5069   0.4341 
 F-statistic 4.2992***   3.4533***   4.6425***   3.6533***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both 
cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 
percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 13. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for small bank sample: Do private credit bureaus matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA 0.1911 1.2811 0.2469 0.8601     
  NDISCTA -0.4462*** -3.3611 -0.8710*** -3.4622     
  DISCL     
  
0.2509 0.5589 0.8659 0.7837 
NDISCL     
  
-2.3364*** -4.7392 -4.1274*** -4.8387 
EQTA -0.1774 -1.2983 -0.5989 -1.6061 -0.1703 -0.8856 -0.4892 -1.3183 
DTA -0.0189 -0.2148 -0.0365 -0.1500 -0.0712 -0.6993 -0.0996 -0.4154 
SIZE 0.0606*** 3.4235 0.0920** 2.1408 0.0688*** 3.6111 0.1098*** 2.6252 
LGDPR -0.1363 -1.5463 -0.1672 -0.8863 -0.2000** -2.2930 -0.2986* -1.6629 
SHRATE -1.0856*** -4.8335 -2.1935*** -3.8738 -1.0751*** -4.7233 -2.1857*** -3.9874 
PRIVBUR 0.0309 1.1740 0.0526 0.8475 0.0259 1.1602 0.0367 0.6054 
DISCTA*PRIVBUR -1.4731** -2.0282 -2.7274* -1.8608     
  DISCL*PRIVBUR     
  
-1.8905** -2.3426 -4.9161** -2.5713 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 817 
 
794 
 
816 
 
793 
 R-squared 0.4844   0.4163 
 
0.5096   0.4389 
 F-statistic 4.3051***   3.4489***   4.6512***   3.6819***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PRIVBUR is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a private credit 
bureau. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 14. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for small bank sample: Do public credit registries matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA -0.2113 -0.7748 -0.0201 -0.0345     
  NDISCTA -0.4558*** -2.9749 -0.7069** -2.1187     
  DISCL     
  
-0.4868* -1.7101 -0.7394 -0.8408 
NDISCL     
  
-2.3535*** -10.1207 -4.2152*** -6.8236 
EQTA -0.1905 -1.3890 -0.6130* -1.9035 -0.1630 -0.9884 -0.4728** -2.0979 
DTA -0.0346 -0.4119 -0.0640 -0.3471 -0.0907 -0.7138 -0.1095 -0.3849 
SIZE 0.0582*** 3.0802 0.0792** 2.0259 0.0646*** 3.2073 0.0945** 2.1791 
LGDPR -0.1527* -1.7779 -0.1939 -1.0879 -0.2114** -2.3798 -0.3103 -1.3569 
SHRATE -1.1046*** -4.9077 -2.2337*** -4.8511 -1.0823*** -3.3289 -2.1940*** -2.9573 
PUBREG -0.0235 -0.3013 0.0249 0.1539 -0.0025 -0.0274 0.0439 0.2198 
DISCTA*PUBREG 1.5881** 1.1326 0.1512 0.0499     
  DISCL*PUBREG     
  
3.2664** 1.8659 6.0932** 1.4283 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 817 
 
794 
 
816 
 
793 
 R-squared 0.4813   0.4126 
 
0.5073   0.4336 
 F-statistic 4.2633***   3.4116***   4.6177***   3.6250***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and short-term 
funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE is short-
term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. PUBREG is the proportion of individuals and firms listed by a public credit 
registry. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed effects. *** 
indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
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Table 15. Loan loss provisions and loan growth for small bank sample: Do borrowers’ legal rights matter? 
Explanatory variables 
DLOAN LOANG DLOAN LOANG 
Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic Coefficient t-Statistic 
 
    
  
    
  DISCTA 0.2292 0.3070 -2.2657 -1.1187     
  NDISCTA -0.3540*** -2.7741 -0.6109*** -2.6528     
  DISCL     
  
-2.9525*** -3.0522 -8.2554*** -2.9595 
NDISCL     
  
-2.3918*** -4.6287 -4.3927*** -4.7290 
EQTA -0.1924 -0.9151 -0.6332* -1.7061 -0.1120 -0.6141 -0.4933 -1.3875 
DTA -0.0373 -0.3773 -0.0526 -0.2213 -0.0834 -0.8668 -0.0892 -0.3987 
SIZE 0.0565*** 2.6917 0.0758* 1.7246 0.0596*** 2.9677 0.0852** 1.9941 
LGDPR -0.1742* -1.7416 -0.1327 -0.6646 -0.1762* -1.8119 -0.1837 -0.9499 
SHRATE -1.1234*** -4.5354 -2.1965*** -3.8244 -1.0807*** -4.6708 -2.1445*** -3.8691 
LEGAL 0.5606 0.3960 -0.7147 -0.2402 -0.3695 -0.2701 -2.2142 -0.7542 
DISCTA*LEGAL -3.3136 -0.2399 43.1925 1.1136     
  DISCL*LEGAL     
  
49.1530*** 3.0735 146.8840*** 2.6871 
 
    
  
    
  Observations 817   794   816   793   
R-squared 0.4803   0.4147 
 
0.5117   0.4423 
 F-statistic 4.2502***   3.4319   4.6820***   3.7189***   
Notes: DLOAN is the change in the ratio of total loans to total assets calculated from Bouvatier and Lepetit (2008). LOANG is the 
annual loan growth rate. DISCL and DISCTA represent discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the residuals of equations 
(1a) and (1b), respectively. NDISCL and NDISCTA represent non-discretionary loan loss provisions calculated from the fitted values 
of equations (1a) and equations (1b), respectively. EQTA is the ratio of total equity to total assets. DTA is the ratio of deposits and 
short-term funds to total assets. SIZE is the logarithm of total assets. LGDPR is the logarithm of real gross domestic product. SHRATE 
is short-term interest rate proxied by the central bank policy rate. LEGAL is the strength of borrowers’ legal rights developed by the 
Doing Business database. Estimations are carried out using Panel Least Squares controlling for both cross-sectional and period fixed 
effects. *** indicates significance at the 1 percent level, while ** and * indicate significance at the 5 percent and 10 percent levels, 
respectively. 
 
